Introduction
Banks are the critical infrastructure component in an economy. They provide financing for individuals and corporations, and facilitate the transmission of funds across payment systems. The effective functioning of any economy depends on banks ensuring the supply of credit and liquidity throughout the business cycle and in all market conditions. The importance of banks to human wellbeing and societal development is recognised by the fact that in any every country banking is a regulated industry and protected by taxpayer-funded safety nets. The efficient mobilisation and allocation of funds is dependent on efficient corporate governance at banks. When they are able to undertake this, the cost of capital is lowered for all market participants. This in turn increases capital formation and raises productivity growth. Therefore the management of banks has implications for corporate as well as national prosperity. This in turn highlights the importance, and central function, of bank governance. It is self-evident then, that bank corporate governance must be robust, effective, adaptable to changing circumstances and fit for purpose.
In the banking industry corporate governance refers to the manner in which the business and strategy of the institution are governed by the firm's board and senior management. An accurate and succinct description of it is given by the BIS [1] , which describes the mechanics of bank corporate governance as (i) setting the bank's objectives, including target rate of return for shareholders (ii) setting the control framework that oversees the daily operations of the bank (iii) protecting customer deposits (iv) setting strategy that accounts for the interests of all stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers and suppliers and (v) maintaining the bank as a going concern irrespective of economic conditions and throughout the business cycle.
A banking crisis highlights the failure of bank corporate governance with dramatic effect. The financial crash and economic recession of 2007-2009 resulted in the demise of a number of banks, of varying size and systemic importance, in the US and Europe. The evidence from the crash is that corporate governance at many banks failed completely, at least with respect to points (iv) and (v) above, and in many cases with respect to all five governance objectives. This was despite the fact that the banking sector is heavily regulated and subject to internationally agreed rules on capital buffers and accounting transparency.
In this article we review the experience of a sample of failed banks in the period leading up to, and during, the crash. We observe the conduct of boards and senior management, as well as the governance infrastructure in place, to determine lessons for policy going forward. The main contribution of this paper is to highlight failures of governance, to identify sources of risk as important determinants of a bank's corporate governance structure, and to draw on the conclusions arising from the study to formulate recommendations for policy. We outline a more effective framework for governance infrastructure, one that is better suited to managing risk under volatile market conditions. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Literature review; Conventional corporate governance structure; Market observations; Conclusion, and Policy recommendations.
Literature
There is a not inconsiderable literature on the subject of bank corporate governance, with the emphasis on the infrastructure of management reporting and board composition. Saunders et al conclude that bank ownership and management structure influence risk taking [2] , while Caprio et al look at how these factors 182 Effective bank corporate governance… influence bank valuations [3] . Prowse and Macey, and O'Hara suggest mechanisms for the governance infrastructure of banks, [4] [5] , and Barth et al consider how regulatory mechanisms influence risk taking. [6] .
The BIS study is typical of those from regulatory bodies in proposing a governance outline [1] . It recommends the board to set strategy and establish accountability of senior management. It points out that governance infrastructure varies by jurisdiction, with some country regimes setting a supervisory role and no executive powers for bank boards; other regimes allow for a broader remit that lays down a general framework for management. In other words, there is no universal set of rules on bank corporate governance. This is still the case.
Levine notes the importance of strengthening the ability and incentive of private investors to exert governance control over banks, rather than relying excessively on government regulation [7] . Shareholder education is a vital part of this control.
The influence of debt holders is post-facto, and dependent on the legal infrastructure and bankruptcy system in place. This is significant, and implies that debt holders do not exert adequate controlling influence on bank strategy and management until the point where the bank ceases to be a going concern. In a bull market environment, managers and shareholders may prefer this, and the finding of Myers that debt holders are risk averse would support this surmise [8] .
However as a form of macroprudential management and control, the influence of debt holders is vital for effective governance. In a notable pointer for future policy, Levine finds that state-owned banks are not a solution to the problem of inadequate governance. [7] Laeven and Levine is an important contribution to the literature given its date of publication, which preceded the onset of the crisis [9] . They conclude that bank regulations, including capital requirements and supervisory oversight, do not directly influence risk taking. Their study highlights the need to examine how a bank's ownership and management control structure combines with national regulatory policy to influence bank risk origination. Amongst their findings the most significant is that traditional regulatory policy does not drive risk aversion; the two key components of Basel II, regulatory capital requirements and supervisory oversight, do not appear to reduce risk taking. They also find that bank shareholders have incentives to increase risk exposure after collecting deposits and debt from investors. This suggests that shareholder presence on the board is not a risk control device, rather the opposite, and also argues for the presence of debt holders.
The United Kingdom House of Commons Treasury Committee makes several observations based on its study of bank governance in the lead-up to the crash [10] .
Among its findings are that the system of non-executive director (NED) oversight was flawed, because it had degenerated into a "cosy club", with insufficient time committed to their role by NEDs who also combined their board responsibilities with full-time employment and directorships at other firms. Critically, NEDs also lacked sufficient relevant expertise. However the finding that bank boards lacked diversity in their NED complement is difficult to justify, given the wide mix of backgrounds of many board members. In anything bank boards were over-diversified, at the expense of financial sector expertise and experience.
Treasury Committee concludes with recommendations that (i) the talent pool on the board be enlarged (ii) NEDs be restricted on the number of directorships they accept (iii) the board be supported by a dedicated secretariat and (iv) all board members, both executive and NEDs, demonstrate sufficient expertise before being appointed.
From the viewpoint of corporate governance, the most significant finding in the Treasury Committee report is that bank shareholders do not subject boards to sufficient scrutiny. In fact shareholders have an incentive to increase risk exposure, particularly after a period of increasing returns. This was also observed in Laeven and Levine [9] . The experience of KBC Financial Products, discussed later in this article, is instructive in this regard.
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The conventional bank corporate governance framework
We noted in the literature review that there is no universal bank corporate governance model. Differences in organisation and infrastructure differ by regulatory jurisdiction and also within them, depending on the type of institution being considered. The Basel Committee, as noted by the BCBS and BIS, [11] , [1] suggest the following, inter alia, as elements of strategy and technique that are essential to an effective corporate governance arrangement: a coherent and explicit statement of strategy for the business, with stated required return and performance measures; clear and transparent outline of responsibilities for the executive management; explicit lines of authority and communication, from board downwards and from business lines upwards; strong framework of internal control, and accountability, and review procedures and processes for this control (including internal and external audit arrangements and a board audit-risk committee); an effective risk management framework that also describes the monitoring and reporting of all risk exposures; transparent information flows both internally and externally.
These principles are still required in the current post-crisis environment. In the wake of the crash, it is reasonable to conclude that the above principles were not observed at many banks. However that does not suggest that these principles need to be changed, but rather observed and enforced more adequately and, in a number of key respects, added to.
Irrespective of the regulatory jurisdiction of a bank, at the top level there are five areas of governance over which strong oversight must be established; these are (i) genuine controlling supervision by the board of directors; (ii) supervision by individuals who do not work within the business lines; (iii) direct executive supervision of each business line; (iv) independent audit and risk management sub-boards, and (v) senior personnel who are sufficiently expert in their jobs. In other words, in the post-crisis era, a "rubber stamp" review board will not be acceptable.
The board should establish a coherent, articulated strategy for the bank. This is stated by the BIS [1] , but was not always observed in practice. However strategy objectives must be reviewed on a frequent basis, so that they can be altered as necessary to respond to changes in economic circumstances. Such "macroprudential" oversight is perhaps the most difficult aspect of a board's responsibilities. Further, board directors must be qualified to perform their role and must be able to access all necessary information, on a timely basis, to enable them to perform their duties. The events during the crash suggest that this was not always the case.
Board structure and role
The most effective composition of a bank board remains an issue for debate.
Heidrick and Struggles define three different forms of board structure that are common in Western Europe and North America [12] , which are illustrated in Figure 1 .
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Chairman and CEO Figure 1 Board structures Other metrics reported in the study are also uncorrelated with the experience of banks during the crisis; for instance the average number of board members at European banks is 11.8, however countries above this figure (Belgium, with 12.7 on average) and below it (the United Kingdom, average of 8.5) both suffered banking crises. However the issue of the most effective size of a board remains contentious. Advocates of large boards believe that these allow scope for representation of diverse interests, as well as a wider range of expertise. The experience of banks in the crisis however, suggests that large boards are unwieldy, as well as unable to react quickly enough to fast-moving events.
Board objectives and senior management
The composition and objectives of the board should be set to prevent a specific interest group from gaining overall control. Levine notes that concentrated shareholders can act to exert control over diffuse shareholders and debt holders. [7] Thus board objectives must be set with this in mind. Transparency in operation and reporting is a key requirement.
The performance of senior management is as important to corporate governance as that of the board. The same principles of independent supervisory oversight, relevant experience and suitable expertise, are required of management as they are of the board. The BIS noted situations to be avoided by senior management [1] , but which were nevertheless evident at certain banks during the crisis, such as (i) senior managers involved in business line decision making (ii) senior managers lacking sufficient expertise and (iii) managers unwilling or unable to maintain control over so-called "star" performers.
The BIS report also suggested more frequent board meetings, and meetings of board sub-committees, than is generally the norm. Of the bank failures observed in this study, no bank conducted board and sub-committee meetings more than once a month, with an average frequency of one meeting every eight weeks. The pace of events in 2008 suggests that such a frequency is insufficient to meet risk management demands. We illustrate the speed at which events occurred with two charts: Figure 2 shows the Chicago Board Options Exchange VIX contract, an indicator of market volatility in the S&P500 equity index, for the period July-October 2008. From a stable level we note the sudden increase in volatility from September, following the collapse of Lehmans, which took markets by surprise (although the funding and capital issues at that firm had already been under scrutiny). Figure 3 , the credit default swap price for Morgan Stanley during the same period, shows the same sudden rise in volatility. The administrative support required for board and senior management meetings makes it problematic to hold them at greater frequency, thus a less unwieldy sub-committee structure may be required. This would make senior management better able to respond to changing events. The observations in this section provide a selection of failure in corporate governance and control at the banks that failed or required government bailout.
We concentrate on those issues of governance that can be addressed directly with practical recommendations for improvement.
United Kingdom banks
The United Kingdom (UK) was the first country to experience difficulties in its 
Northern Rock plc
This bank exhibited a classic failure of best-practice corporate governance in two respects: the inability of the board to exercise sufficient checks and balances on a senior director, in this case the chief executive officer (CEO), and insufficient banking expertise within the board itself, principally the chair.
The UK banking sector was characterised by a high level of competition. Banks competed against each other to attract deposits. All else being equal, the bank that is able to pay the highest deposit rate will attract most deposits. This is only sustainable from a bottom-line viewpoint by taking on more risk on the asset side of the balance sheet. This happened with the UK bank Northern Rock plc, and was stated by the Chairman of Dunfermline Building Society as a factor in its demise.
In part due to its more aggressive credit portfolio, Northern Rock was able to pay out a higher rate on its clients' deposit accounts compared to that paid by the big "high street" banks, as noted in Cooper. [14] The institution began with conservative beginnings, as a building society concentrating solely on regional mortgages and deposits. In 1997 it converted to a bank, and pursued an aggressive policy of growth and geographical expansion.
However the deposit base was not extended significantly beyond its regional roots.
CEO Adam Applegarth was the driving force behind the growth strategy.
Muradoglu notes that in the first half of 2007, Northern Rock originated GBP 10.7bln of mortgages, an increase of 47% from one year previously and which represented 19% of all new mortgages during that period, elevating the firm to market leader. [15] At the time, the bank was ranked the eight largest in the UK, and this share of the mortgage market arose from aggressive marketing and an extension of the risk-reward profile. Northern Rock, for example, was a key supplier of both 100% loan-to-value (LTV) and 125% LTV loans, the central premise behind which was that house prices will never fall. This was not an assumption restricted to Northern Rock; the credit ratings agencies implicitly assumed continuously rising house prices, on a national scale, in the methodology of their rating models for structured finance securities (noted for example, by The shortfall in funding could not be made up without recourse to the central bank, which resulted in the bank's demise shortly after when it was nationalised by the UK government.
The overarching component of Northern Rock strategy was a desire for balance sheet growth, and ever-increasing market share, a strategy put in place shortly after the bank floated on the stock market. This was driven by the CEO, with acquiescence from the board. The board failed to notice signs of overheating in the with a background as a zoologist and science writer.
HBOS plc
The Although technically bankrupt, the government encouraged Lloyds TSB to take over HBOS, which it completed in January 2009, apparently without any due diligence on the extent of its losses. Once these were known, Lloyds TSB was partly nationalised by the government.
Royal Bank of Scotland
The failure at RBS reflected a number of factors, the most significant of which the US mortgage market, and also the falling prices in the ABS market. That RBS continued to pursue the ABN Amro takeover suggests that the board were either unaware of this or chose to ignore it. Either of these is a failure of governance.
The issue becomes one of behavioural economics; for example DeBondt et al suggest that in the pursuit of profits the existing regulatory and governance regime is not able to prevent CEOs and boards from undertaking ever more risky ventures.
[18] That the board was not able to consider the ABN Amro takeover more critically is one of the factors that led to the bank's failure. An appreciation by CEOs and boards of banking history, or at least a familiarity with previous crises, would generate more appropriate risk management culture.
For example Boyd and Gertler, assessing the US banking crisis of the early 1980s, conclude that liquidity should never be taken for granted and banks must manage the liability side of the balance sheet with sufficient prudence and conservatism to allow for future changes in market circumstances. [19] It is clear that the RBS board, and Andy Hornby at HBOS, were not familiar with the basics of bank liquidity management. We can conclude from this that senior management do not learn the lessons of earlier failures and market corrections, but also that it is essential for the board and senior management to include sufficient individuals with longstanding experience of banking, so that they retain familiarity with the changes that occur in economic conditions.
Another issue is that of data management. A firm of the complexity of RBS is prone to suffering from incomplete management information (MI). This is less of an issue in a stable market, when data that is slightly out-of-date is still of value.
However in a dynamic and/or falling market, it hampers effective governance. A legacy of RBS's growth through acquisition is that there is no one MI system in place; all the constituent parts of the firm such as NatWest, Gartmore, ABN Amro and RBS itself retained their separate accounting and risk management systems.
This made presenting an accurate, timely picture of risk exposure difficult. Senior management and the board were hampered in their decision making as a result.
Ultimately the failure at RBS was a failure of management and governance. A firm of the market strength and size of RBS benefits in the first instance from economies of scale and lower-cost funding. To lead the bank to nationalisation, despite the advantages available to it, was an indictment of the board's lack of credentials to effectively manage a financial institution.
Dunfermline Building Society
Building societies in the UK are retail savings and loans institutions, and therefore inherently conservative in culture and strategy. Dunfermline Building Society Faulds stated that the board had felt that DBS had to change its structure, its business and its IT system in order to remain competitive [20] . provide financial services to its regional community, and nothing more. Expansion for its own sake was not on the members' agenda. Faulds' quote also reveals the common mistake of equating absolute size and market presence with genuine shareholder (or membership) added value. The desire to gain market share had been a factor in Northern Rock's failure, and it would appear was the case for DBS as well. Furthermore, the comment suggests a short-term strategy of instant growth, in what was seen as a rising market, rather than attempting to follow a coherent policy of long-term value and growth in a sector the firm was expert in.
As part of the new strategy, DBS invested in MBS bonds and lower quality mortgages such as self-certified loans, purchased from two "sub-prime" mortgage providers, GMAC and a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers. These assets suffered write-downs of over 50% of their notional value during 2008. At the same government testimony, when asked whether members were aware of the risks involved in engaging in MBS and commercial lending, Mr Faulds stated, "the members did not know that at the time. We knew that but we believed that we managed those risks reasonably well [sic] ." The self-certified loans purchased from GMAC and Lehmans "were performing but not as well as loans we found ourselves." The DBS chairman stated further, "In retrospect I would rather we had not taken on self-certified loans." The impression of this series of events is that of a managing board that was drawn into a sector with which it was unfamiliar and inexpert in, and which was outside its core business area. "We went for a system that we thought would make us extremely
competitive. It was too challenging, it took too long, it took too much money and we made a mistake."
This in itself is not a failure of corporate governance. What is significant however is the manner in which this event was communicated to members; the statement did not highlight that it was due to management failure; instead, the losses were written off as "excellent progress" in the annual report [21] . The parliamentary commission concluded that the DBS board lost direction, and in allowing the increased costs possibly committed a breach of the duties owed to DBS members. It also described as "disingenuous" the description of the GBP 9.5m loss written off on the IT project in the Members Review as "excellent progress", as noted by HM Treasury [20] .
UBS AG
The Swiss bank UBS was the recipient of a USD 59 billion government bailout at the end of 2008, after reporting large losses in its structured credit business. This was reported by Bloomberg [22] . The bailout included a USD 5.2 billion capital injection. The experience of UBS mirrored that of other banks that were rescued by their governments, in that the failure of specific business lines was exacerbated by failures in governance. In the case of UBS, the senior directors of the bank did not identify a flaw in the internal funding arrangement in place, which allowed the structured credit business to book artificial profits. This demonstrated a lack of expertise by senior management, as well as an inability to involve itself at a sufficient level of detail in what was an important discipline and control mechanism.
As a key driver of the economic decision-making process, the cost at which funds are lent from central Treasury to a bank's business lines needs to be set at a rate that reflects the true liquidity risk position of each business line. If this is unrealistic, there is a risk that transactions are entered into that produce an unrealistic profit. This profit will reflect the artificial funding gain, rather than the true economic value-added of the business. Evidence of the damage that can be caused by artificially low transfer pricing can be found in UBS's own annual shareholder report. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson discuss the losses at UBS AG in its structured credit business, which originated and invested in collateralised debt obligations (CDO). [23] Quoting the UBS report,
"…internal bid prices were always higher than the relevant London inter-bank bid rate (LIBID) and internal offer prices were always lower than relevant London inter-bank offered rate (LIBOR)." (p.97)
In other words, UBS structured credit business was able to fund itself at prices better than in the market (which is implicitly inter-bank risk), despite the fact that
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There was no adjustment for tenor mismatch, to better align term funding to liquidity. A more realistic funding model was viewed as a "constraint on the growth strategy". We observe again the pursuit of growth and market share for its own sake, rather than genuine shareholder added value.
This lack of funding discipline played an important role in the decision making process, because it allowed the desk to report inflated profits based on low funding costs. As a stand-alone business, a CDO investor would not expect to raise funds at sub-Libor, but rather at significantly over Libor. By receiving this artificial low pricing, the desk could report super profits and very high return-on-capital, which encouraged more and more risky investment decisions. A correct transfer pricing mechanism would have enforced greater discipline on the business lines. That senior management was not aware of this flaw in the internal funding process reflects poorly on its expertise in this area (a fundamental ingredient of banking), and on its knowledge of the bank's core processes. FP was another institution that had implemented an inadequate internal funds pricing mechanism. The majority of its liquidity came from the parent, a AA-rated bank at the time, which was lent to the subsidiary at a rate of Libor plus a uniform transfer price. This transfer price was below 20 basis points (noted by Choudhry [25] ). However one particular business line at FP, the funds derivative desk, originated assets in partnership with hedge fund of funds. This involved lending to investors in hedge funds via a leveraged structured product. These instruments were illiquid, with maturities of two years or longer. Once dealt, they could not be unwound, thus creating significant liquidity stress for the lender. The failure of KBC Bank, which would have moved into administration without state intervention, was a failure of governance. The board did not possess the expertise and knowledge necessary to effectively supervise its derivatives subsidiary, and was not aware of the extent of its risk exposure. Furthermore the years prior to the crash, which had seen FP report excess profits, had created a complacent attitude that further eroded adequate board oversight.
Lehman Brothers
The failure of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers is abundantly covered in the existing literature. From the corporate governance viewpoint, what is instructive is the cult of personality of the CEO, Dick Fuld, and the negative impact this had on the firm's management. In this respect, it provides lessons for regulators and policymakers.
The remuneration structure at Lehman's placed significant emphasis on employee share ownership. The annual bonus of all staff was paid partly in the form of stock options, vested over a period of two, three or five years and not realisable if the individual left the firm's employment. The performance and risk-taking culture of the company suggests then that a personal stake in the company at agent level (the senior management), did not reduce the desire to originate risk. In the case of Lehman's therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the compensation and bonus culture was a factor in the firm's demise. It appears instead that the dominance of certain "eccentric personalities" at senior management was the prime factor. This is evident from reading the findings of Sorkin, and McDonald and Robinson [26] [27]. The authors suggest that the CEO and his President, Joe Gregory did not fully understand the risks involved in the new investment banking environment in place from the 1990s onwards.
In the two references noted above, the words "remote" and "denial" appear frequently when describing the personality of the two Lehman executives. What is implied is that these shortcomings were due to megalomania, ego and envy. An example of this is given by McDonald and Robinson, describing the way Dick
Fuld dealt with the success of the private equity firm Blackstone [27] . This firm was managed by two ex-Lehman managing directors, Peter Peterson and Stephen
Schwarz, who it appears were not on speaking terms with the Lehman CEO.
Rather than focus on the core business, as advised by the senior investment banking team (Larry McCarthy, Mike Gelband and Alex Kirk), which had warned about the growing risks in private equity and high-risk leveraged finance, the authors suggest that Mr. Fuld was driven by frustration and envy to start investing in hedge funds, energy companies, commodities and leveraged mortgages, apparently not only to match the success of Blackstone, but also because of a desire to top the league tables published on Wall Street. This obsession arose to such irrational levels that at certain times when high-risk strategic acquisitions were being discussed at the executive committee, the head of risk management was asked to leave the room. Clearly, if we accept this as story as fact, it is not only worrying but also dangerous for any firm.
The example of Lehman is another one of failed corporate governance, and again resulting from the drive and excessive influence of one particular individual. Like 204
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Northern Rock, it has implications for how bank boards can improve their policies and procedures so that they are not at risk from this type of behaviour in future.
Conclusion
The sample of failed firms in this study, all of whom required taxpayer support or in the case of Lehmans was allowed to go bankrupt, is notable for its diversity. In other words, regulation and governance needs to be enforced by fiat to take account of weaknesses caused by human nature. We noted earlier the lack of transparency in the corporate governance of DBS, and the personality cult at Lehman's that made effective board oversight of company direction difficult. De
Bondt et al suggest that in the pursuit of short-term super profits, current regulations and governance culture were not sufficient to prevent bank management from "bending financial reports in their favour." [18] These examples lead to a conclusion that bank governance needs to be organised formally with stronger, more effective controls and oversight regulation, at the risk of further failure due to behavioural factors at the time of the next crash.
The behavioural issues we have identified in the case studies are a factor because of the nature of financial markets. The paradox of financial assets is that their price behaviour is different to other assets, in that rising prices leads to rising Effective bank corporate governance… independent direction. Board members were not geared towards a long-term view of the bank's development, and in some cases lacked sufficient expertise to carry out the function they were entrusted with. An emphasis on peer-level comparisons of market share was allowed to shape strategy, an approach that places low emphasis on shareholder added-value and the firm's core strengths.
Policy Recommendations
From its observation of a number of failed banks, this study concludes that current bank corporate governance culture and legislation is insufficient to deal with the risk of failure when markets crash. We recommend a number of measures designed to strengthen the infrastructure of corporate governance, and to increase the effectiveness of boards when dealing with dynamic and volatile market environments. If necessary, these measures should be imposed by regulatory fiat: shareholders, and concentrating on such performance parameters, will be pre-disposed to lower risk discipline in a rising market. Furthermore, Levine suggests that shareholders "have incentives to raise the bank's risk profile [7] .
Debt holders, however, do not enjoy any upside potential from risk-taking but do on the downside if the bank cannot service its debts." Rarely however, if ever, are bondholders represented on the board. If they were, the accent on policies and strategies would be more risk averse. Therefore we recommend that bank boards be required to appoint at least one member who is a representative of the major debt holders in the company.
Expert knowledge of board members:
In our observation of the events at KBC Bank, we noted that board members were not familiar with securitisation techniques and structured credit products, and with specific structures within their own group. For board membership, financial services expertise is a prerequisite. Non-executive directors must have financial services expertise, and executive directors -including CEOs -must have direct relevant experience. We noted that Bradford & Bingley and HBOS, two failed UK banks, appointed CEOs from the retail sector, and the Chairman of RBS had previously managed a charity. We recommend therefore that the regulator approve only suitably qualified persons for board membership. The expertise of board members must be reviewed annually by bank regulators.
Management understanding of core strategy: a frequent refrain in risk management principles is to know one's risk. This maxim is also relevant for senior management from a governance point of view. We observed that a board that has no clear understanding of the bank's direction, beyond a simple one of growth in absolute size and market share, can be easily influenced into higher risk business. This was the case at Northern Rock and DBS. We Otherwise, the role is more effectively undertaken by an internal board sub-committee. We recommend therefore that such board sub-committees consist only of those with proven bank experience and expertise gained over the business cycle.
Transparency: We observed that frequently senior management did not issue transparent notices of strategy, intent and risk exposure to shareholders. In the case of DBS, the description of events in the annual report was kept opaque.
We recommend that regulators enforce a requirement, reviewed annually, that management communicate to shareholders in precise and clear fashion the extent of the bank's risk and losses.
At many banks the performance of senior management and boards during the crisis of 2008 was unsatisfactory. It is apparent that current corporate governance infrastructure is not sufficiently robust to handle market corrections. We have outlined a range of recommendations that should, if implemented by banks and enforced by regulators, assist management to better handle events during the next crash.
